Abstract. We propose the first leakage-resilient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme with full domain hash structure. Our scheme is leakageresilient in the relative leakage model and the random oracle model under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption.
Introduction
Cryptographic schemes are used to be analyzed in an attack model in which the internal secret states are completely hidden from the adversary/attacker. However several works [12, 13] indicated that the attack model fails to capture many attacks in the real world, since the attacker may obtain some partial information about the secret states via various key leakage attacks. Therefore it is urgent to design leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes which remain provably secure in the strengthened attack model which takes key leakage attacks into account.
Recently, the research community pay a lot of attention to construct IBE schemes with leakage-resilience. Alwen et al. [1] presented three leakage-resilient IBE schemes from the Gentry IBE [10] , the Boneh-GentryHamburg IBE [4] , and Gentry-Peikert-Vaikuntanathan IBE [11] , respectively. Among them, the first scheme is secure in the standard model, while the other two schemes are secure in the random oracle model. Chow et al. [6] gave three new leakage-resilient IBE schemes from the BonehBoyen IBE [2] , the Waters IBE [16] , and the Lewko-Waters IBE [14] , respectively. All of them are secure in the standard model.
Our Contributions. According to [5] , IBE schemes from pairings can be classified into three broad families, the full-domain hash family (e.g.
Boneh-Franklin IBE [3] ), the exponent inversion family (e.g. Gentry-IBE [10] ), and the commutative blinding family (e.g. Boneh-Boyen IBE [2] ). The existing work [1, 6] have shown that IBE schemes from the exponent inversion family and commutative blinding family can be tailored to be leakage-resilient ones. It is natural to ask if we can strengthen the IBE schemes from the full domain hash family to be leakage-resilient.
We give an affirmative answer to the above question by presenting an IBE scheme with the full domain hash structure based on a variant of Boneh-Franklin IBE [7] . Its leakage-resilient chosen plaintext security can be tightly reduced to the DBDH assumption in the relative leakage model and the random oracle model.
Preliminaries
Notations. x R ← − S denotes that x is picked uniformly at random from the set S. We write PPT for probabilistic polynomial time. By negl(n) we denote a negligible function of n. We denote the bit-wise XOR operation by ⊕. We denote by I the identity space and by SK the private key space.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The decisional BDH (DBDH) assumption [2, 3] is defined via the following game: the challenger runs the bilinear group generator GroupGen(1 κ ) to generate (p, G, G T , e), picks four random exponents x, y, z, w from Z p , then computes g x , g y , g z , T 0 = e(g, g) xyz and T 1 = e(g, g) xyw . We denote by D the tuple (p, G, G T , e, g, g x , g y , g z ). The challenger picks a random bit c and gives to the adversary B the challenge instance (D, T c ). We say B succeeds in solving the DBDH problem if it outputs the right guess c for c at the end of the game, whose advantage is defined as:
The (t, )-DBDH assumption holds if no t-time adversary has at least in solving the DBDH problem in G.
Randomness Extractors
The following notions and primitives will be used in our construction. We refer the readers to [1, 15] for a complement knowledge. For a random variable X, we define H ∞ (X) = − log(max x Pr[X = x]) as its min-entropy. We use the notion of average min-entropy [8] which captures the remaining unpredictability of a random variable X conditioned on another random variable Y , formally defined as
where E y←Y denotes the expected value over all values of Y .
The average min-entropy measures exactly the optimal probability of guessing X given knowledge of Y . The following lemma was proved in [9] regarding average min-entropy:
The statistical distance between two random variables X, Y over a finite domain Ω is defined as
Same as [1, 6, 15] , a main tool used in our construction is the strong randomness extractor, which is formally defined as follows to the setting of the average min-entropy.
where G is a non-empty set, and U µ , U m are two uniformly distributed random variables over {0, 1} µ , {0, 1} m respectively. Dodis et al. [8] proved that any strong extractor is in fact an averagecase strong extractor, for a proper setting of the parameters: Lemma 2. For any δ > 0, if ext is a worst case (m − log(1/δ), )-strong extractor, then ext is also an average-case (m, + δ)-strong extractor.
As a specific example, they proved the following lemma which essentially gives an explicit construction of an average-case strong extractor: Lemma 3. Let X, Y be two random variables such that X ∈ G and
Leakage Model for IBE Setting
In this paper we use the relative leakage model suitable for the IBE setting. The leakage-resilient chosen plaintext security is defined by the following LeakCPA game, which is refined from the CpaLeak game introduced in [6] . Setup. The challenger generates the public parameters mpk and the master secret key msk. It gives mpk to the adversary and keeps msk to itself. Phase 1. The adversary can make one of the following two types of queries to the challenger: 1. Leak(I, h i ) query, where h i : SK → {0, 1} i . The challenger checks if the overall amount leakage will exceed . If not, it responds with h i (sk). Otherwise it responds with a reject symbol ⊥.
2. Reveal(I) query, where I is the identity. The challenger responds with the associated private key sk.
Challenge. The adversary submits two messages M 0 , M 1 of equal size and a challenge identity I * , with the restriction that I * has not been revealed. The challenger picks a random bit β and encrypts M β under I * . It sends the resulting ciphertext C * to the adversary.
Phase 2. The same as Phase 1 with the restriction that no leakage queries or reveal queries related to I * are allowed.
Guess. The adversary outputs a bit β . We say it succeeds if β = β . The advantage of an adversary A on breaking an IBE scheme E with security parameter κ and leakage bound is defined as Adv 
Our Scheme
Our scheme consists of the following four algorithms: (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) = (g r , s, e(g 1 , g 2 ) r , M ⊕ ext(e(u, g 1 ) r , s) ). C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) encrypted under I using the associated private key sk = (
Decrypt. To decrypt a ciphertext
. It is easy to verify that if the private key matches, we get the right decryption.
Security Analysis
Theorem 3.1 If the DBDH assumption holds and the extractor's second parameter ext is negligible in κ, then the proposed scheme is -leakage secure, where = log |G T | − k and k is the extractor's first parameter.
To prove the theorem, we organize the proof as a sequence of games, which are defined as follows: Game Real : The real CPALeak game.
Game Final : The real CPALeak game except in the challenge phase the challenger generates the ciphertext as follows:
where t * is the tag of private key sk * of the challenge identity I * , z and w are randomly picked from Z p . The challenge ciphertext is C * = (c * 1 , c * 2 , c * 3 , c * 4 ). Note that if w = z, then C * is not a valid ciphertext since it is only decrypted correctly when using the private key with tag t * .
Lemma 3.2 If there exists a PPT algorithm A such that Adv
= , then we can build a PPT algorithm B with advantage in breaking the DBDH problem.
Proof. Suppose B is given a DBDH challenge (p, G, G T , e, g, g x , g y , g z , T ). We now describe how it interacts with A in the following game: Setup. B sets g 1 = g x (implicitly sets msk = x), g 2 = g y , picks a suitable extractor function ext, then gives A the public parameters mpk = (p, G, G T , e, g, g 1 , g 2 , ext).
Hash queries. For a fresh hash query on I, B picks a, t R ← − Z p and responds with u = g a g t 2 .
KeyGen queries. For an arbitrary identity I, B computes a private key for it as follows: (1) 
. We note that the keygen queries are always implicitly called by B when it answers the associated leak queries and reveal queries. Phase 1. To answer the leak queries and reveal queries issued by A, B creates two lists L and K, which are initially empty. L is a list of triples of identities, private keys, and a leakage counter, while K is a list of tuples of identities, private keys.
-Leak(I, h i ) query: B checks if there is a tuple I, sk in the existing K list. If it is not B runs sk ← KeyGen(msk, I), inserts the tuple (I, sk) to the K list and the triple I, sk, 0 to the L list. After this step there must exists a triple I, sk, num in the L list, B checks if num + i ≤ . If this is true, it responds with h i (sk) and sets num ← num + i in I, sk, num . Otherwise B responds with a reject symbol ⊥.
-Reveal(I) query: B checks if there is a tuple I, sk in the K list. If it is B responds with sk. If it is not B runs sk ← KeyGen(msk, I), inserts the tuple I, sk to the K list and the triple I, sk, 0 to the L list, and responds the leak query with sk. Notice that B can calculate a valid private key for any identity. Therefore, B is able to answer all the leakage queries Leak(I, h i ) and reveal queries Reveal(I), with the corresponding private key sk = (d 1 , d 2 ) . Challenge. A submits two messages M 0 , M 1 and an identity I * on which it want to be challenged to B. B computes sk * = (d * 1 , d * 2 ) = (t * , g a * 1 ), then generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: We will prove that the advantage of B in breaking the DBDH problem is . To see this, notice that if T = e(g, g) xyz the challenge ciphertext is a correct ciphertext according to the original encryption algorithm and thus A plays the Game Real . This is because W = e(g z , g a * 1 )T t * = e(g a * , g z 1 )e(g t * 2 , g z 1 ) = e(g a * g t * 2 , g z 1 ) = e(u * , g 1 ) z as one can easily verify. Thus the probability that A succeeds in the game is exactly 
